

JCC2015 Statement on HFA2 Zero Draft

The Japan CSO Coalition (JCC2015)¹ and its membership, as experienced implementors of the current HFA and future implementors of the HFA2, offer the following points to help strengthen the zero draft to be a more holistic and effective framework.

1. Technical Hazards and Risks

- *Our focus is on Nuclear Hazards and Risks*

The indication that the framework both reflects natural and human induced disasters is a positive sign for JCC2015. More is required to connect nuclear disasters (such as the one in Fukushima 2011 or Chernobyl 1986) with the internationally recognised DRR framework, and advocate for the need to enhance risk identification and addressing such risk factors that exist or are emerging in many countries.

The Fukushima Prefectural Government has repeatedly made unmet requests to the Government of Japan to substantially improve and add, descriptions on these complex nuclear disasters and their enormous economic and social costs.

- *Implementation Toolkits - The Fukushima Booklet*

JCC2015 is committed to producing and distributing a guideline booklet of what actually happened in Fukushima from civil society's perspective, and how various communities can assess, monitor and reduce future risk imposed by nuclear power plants. Monitoring mechanisms and periodic assessments (para 26 f) can be a useful tool to track progress and JCC2015 commits to contribute by adding in nuclear safety indicators/assessment checklists.

- *A holistic approach to technologies*

There is no dispute that there is a need to "enhance access to, and transfer of, environmentally sound technology, science and innovation" (para 40 b). JCC2015 does, however, strongly advocate a more holistic review process for assessing the environmental soundness of technologies. For example, if only levels of CO₂ output are considered for power production, other important environmental considerations, such as waste and risk/result of accidents, may be neglected.

2. Multi-hazard management of disaster risk and Cascading Disasters

- *Cascading Disasters and the interconnectedness of hazards and risks*

JCC2015 believes there is a need to add (in addition to multi-hazard, para 14) the cascading disaster concept of how one hazard directly causes another disaster then in some cases, another. (For example, the Great East Japan Earthquake caused a massive tsunami; which directly led to power and cooling failure at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant; which led to a radiation disaster). JCC2015 applauds the addition of the aim to guide multi-hazard management (para 14) as it also addresses the issue of how interconnected hazards and risks are and the difficulty in managing that.

¹ **Japan CSO Coalition for 2015 WCDRR (JCC2015)** was established in January 2014 to prepare and collate Japanese civil society's inputs towards HFA2 and the 3rd UN WCDRR. The network currently consists of 96 member organisations, representing major segments of Japanese civil society with the following objectives:

1. To contribute to the global DRR movement by sharing the **experiences of civil society and disaster affected populations** in Japan at the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015.
2. To advocate for proactive **inclusion of nuclear risks** at World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015 as well as within HFA2.
3. To share both domestic and international grassroots experiences of Japanese CSOs for tackling **frequently occurring disasters** and critical elements of **disaster resilience** including specific requirements for **vulnerable segments of the population**, building resilient communities, and adapting to climate change.

3. Role of stakeholders

JCC2015 strongly agrees with the inclusion of the “Role of Stakeholders” section and would like to work with all stakeholders to clarify and strengthen these roles.

- *Citizens as scientists and managers*

In addition to ‘scientific’ and ‘research’ institutions (para 23 f), community members as individuals and grassroots organisations can provide empirical studies on risk assessments. For example, residents from Fukushima know exactly what went wrong, organised to monitor and record radiation levels in their communities. This social science type of learning, where citizens act as scientists (not just data collection assistants) should also be prioritised in regional/global cross-learning efforts.

An inclusive all-of-society approach that pre-assigns strategic roles to civil society needs strengthening and inclusion into all phases of assessing, planning, monitoring, responding and recovering.

4. Community leadership, especially women’s leadership

- *Already strong, but can still be strengthened*

Communities that have strong all-inclusive community leadership are essential in achieving the goals and priorities of HFA2 and building resilience. Further guidance is required on how this leadership can be further strengthened and developed in a systematic way that creates empowerment and ownership of DRR policies at the community level. JCC2015 believes that text in the pre-zero draft that calls for women’s leadership to be promoted should be reinserted in following drafts.

- *We will continue to implement programmes that build this further*

JCC2015 member organisations commit to continue and step up programmes that build community leadership and call on other stakeholders, state and non-state, to join in partnership to develop and implement.

5. Period of the Framework, the Global Targets and Accountability

- *Framework aims to achieve the outcomes over the next 20 years*

Our membership notes that DRR strategies take time and understand the move to increase the term of the framework from 10 to 20 years (para 11). Though, we believe that clear instructions are needed on how, how often, and by whom the review of progress and priorities will be done. If the 20 year term is to remain, then a fundamental review at 10 years is needed to re-evaluate that the priorities are in line with the changing world and risks.

- *Weak link between the targets, priorities, roles of stakeholders and the actual implementation*

The Indicators seem to focus on process rather than impact (para 13). The HFA was weak in actual action and addressing underlying risk drivers, especially at sub-national level. Actual implementation level of national/local strategies can also be looked into as possible sub-indicators.

The need for setting baselines (para 22 a) and systematically survey, record and publicly account for all disaster losses (para 22 b) is mentioned but is still not clear on stating how and by whom this is to be done. Without this, accountability for progress or lack of progress will be difficult to achieve.