

# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR (JCC2015) Summary of Contributions towards 6AMCDRR Key Areas

18 June 2014

# **KEY AREA 1:** Building community resilience - turning vulnerability into resilience (by Save the Children Japan)

Children are a vulnerable group within the community, but should play an active role in the community resilience.

- DRR/HFA should refer to children not only in the context of education at schools but as active agents
- National and regional governments should work in partnership with international organizations to create law and policies, which clearly define children's roles in DRR and building community resilience
- Children and their opinions should be included in policy making and reconstruction processes through creating Children Clubs, providing opportunities to speak out and support their ideas in presenting them to government officials, community members and experts
- Existing children groups should address developmental issues with a perspective of DRR
- A virtual platform should be created for these children groups to interact with each other across countries

### **KEY AREA 3:** Local level actions towards DRR

Improve management and coordination of volunteers; Strengthen the strategic role of community and volunteers in all phases of DRR; Build disaster resilient communities.

- Implement systematic training programs in management, leadership skills and DRR for community members and volunteers
- Recognize importance of accountability towards volunteers
- Establish safety as a priority of the communities and organizations
- Develop a mechanism to ensure that all motivated individuals can be an active part of response
- Recognize the strategic role and define the responsibility and activities of coordinated volunteers, including already existing non-disaster community groups in all phases of DRR
- Establish pre-determined roles for community members and volunteers
- Communities should help communities through fostering an awareness during nonemergency phases
- Encourage and enable the whole community, including those most vulnerable, to participate in all phases of DRR

### **KEY AREA 5:** Reducing exposure and underlying risk factors

More information, knowledge and awareness leads to less underlying risks.

For countries possessing nuclear power plants:

- Independent, neutral and impartial nuclear safety regulations need to be made and bodies such as Nuclear Regulation Authority in Japan should be created
- CSO monitoring should be embedded in risk assessment and analysis done by the states
- National and local governments need to state the stakeholders clearly in management/risk reduction plans
- In public consultations for establishment of critical facilities, requirement for clear risk communication needs to be indicated by the legal framework
- Lack of information about nuclear risks are not only an underlying risk for locals but cross border issues
- As long nuclear power is used as a source of electricity, there will always be an underlying risk of an unprecedented disaster

### **KEY AREA 6:** Strengthening risk governance and accountability

The boundaries dividing the responsibilities of the national and local governments and the facility operators must be made clear.

- Establish structure with a consolidated chain of command and the power to deal with emergency situations
- National and local governments must bear responsibility for the response to off-site radiation release and must act with public health and safety as the priority
- Operator of major facilities must assume responsibility for on-site accident response

### **KEY AREA 7:** Engaging Asia-Pacific businesses in disaster risk management

To enhance collaboration between the business sector and NGOs, coordination and engagement on a regional/local level should be emphasized.

- Encourage cross-sector cooperation and continue effective support for areas affected by disasters
- Share resources, experiences and lessons learned from network participants to improve preparedness for future disaster
- Have clear guideline and emphasis from Government or business association on how companies can play a role in community's DRR efforts



# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR (JCC2015) Contribution towards 6AMCDRR for Key Area 1

15 December 2013

### Prepared by Save the Children Japan

National and local governments, NGO s, international organizations and stakeholder groups are invited to make <u>succinct contributions of maximum 5 pages</u>, addressing the following questions:

### 1. What is the issue that your country (organization/stakeholder group) recommends to prioritise in HFA2?

Key area: 1. Building community resilience

<u>Underlying question</u>: c) How can the role of children, youth, women, people with disability and

other vulnerable groups be enhanced in resilience building?

Recommendation: Children are an active agent in disaster risk reduction and building

resilience in communities

### 2. Why have you selected this as a priority?

In the HFA1, children are treated as one of vulnerable groups and targeted as recipients of disaster risk reduction education. Moreover, we consider that children can play an important role in disaster risk reduction and building community resilience.

### a. What is the progress and challenges in addressing this issue?

<u>Progress</u>: The HFA acknowledges that effects of disasters differ from people to people and special attention is required for vulnerable populations, such as children, the elderly, the disabled and the poor.

<u>Challenge</u>: It is generally thought that children are those who are to be protected by adults and their potential to play active roles in communities is not duly recognized. It is important but is not easy to change this mind-set.

### b. Did HFA1 play a role? If not, why?

The HFA1 is not very effective in the above mentioned point, since it addresses community as a whole and does not refer to roles played by different groups of community. Having said that, however, there are increasing opportunities for children to express their opinions on such occasions as AMCDRR and Global Platform. Also, Save the Children, along with UNICEF, PLAN, and World Vision adopted Children's Charter on DRR.

### 3. What are the actions required to address this issue?

- 1) Advocacy
- 2) Raising public awareness on roles played by children
- 3) Providing children with opportunities in communities
- 4) Empowering children in taking actions and making decisions

### 4. List the stakeholders who should be engaged in implementing the recommendations made above.

- 1) International organizations
- 2) National governments
- 3) Local governments
- 4) Non-governmental organizations
- 5) Community leaders
- 6) School teachers
- 7) Parents

### a. What could be the mechanisms to engage and build partnership between the stakeholders?

Law and policies which clearly define children's roles in disaster risk reduction and building community resilience

### 5. How should this issue be addressed in HFA2?

The HFA2 should incorporate children's views and mention that children are an active agent in building community resilience.

### a. What could be the accountability framework to address this issue in HFA2?

b. NGOs which represent children form a committee, and monitor the drafting process of the HFA2.

### c. Who needs to be accountable to take the recommended actions?

National and local governments in partnership with international organizations such as UNISDR, UNCRC.

#### d. Who are the actors will be accountable to?

Children as well as NGOs which facilitate them

# e. What targets and indicators could be used to measure progress and underpin accountability measures?

<u>Targets</u>: laws and policies regarding disaster risk reduction

<u>Indicators</u>: for example,

- whether children's needs and rights are mentioned in laws and policies
- whether children's views are incorporated in laws and policies or not
- whether children's roles are acknowledged in laws and policies or not
- whether there are systems for children to participate in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risk reduction
- whether goods and services which are necessary specifically for children are included in emergency relief and management of evacuation centers

### f. How can these targets and indicators be monitored and measured?

Children and NGOs which work with children will monitor newly established or revised laws and policies on disaster risk reduction and assess how national/local governments give consideration to children.

# 6. Substantiate the recommendations with examples of practices (recommend for not more than 2 examples for each issue), using the suggested Draft template in the next Section III.

Title of the Good practice/case study	Speaking Out From Tohoku (SOFT)
Which key area/ questions the example contributes to	Key area: 1. Building community resilience Underlying question: c) How can the role of children, youth, women, people with disability and other vulnerable groups be enhanced in resilience building?
Abstract	The "Speaking Out" was a child participation programme initiated by the Save the Children Japan (SCJ) with the objective of incorporating children's opinions in making decisions on issues related to them. When the SCJ conducted relief activities after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, we considered that it was very important for children to participate in the reconstruction process, since they are also members of their communities and will play a major role to lead future of the communities. SCJ launched the Speaking Out From Tohoku (SOFT) in the affected region in May, 2011. In this project, children form Children's Community Building Clubs conduct various activities to rebuild better and more resilient communities. The children consult not only with each other, but also with government officials, other community members and experts on implementing various activities in the recovery process.
	As a result of these activities, they compiled their opinions on disaster risk reduction and presented their proposal starting from their local governments, national government, AMCDRR and finally at the 4 Risk Reduction in Geneva, in 2013. This can contribute to create child-friendly and resilient communities not only in Japan but also in other parts of the world.
Context	It is generally thought that children are those who are to be protected by adults. Children's voices are rarely heard of in policy-making. Especially in the Tohoku region, children have few opportunities to participate in community building. However, as stipulated in UNCRC Clause No.12, children have rights to be heard and this must be ensured during the time of disaster response and recovery processes.
	Save the Children Japan (SCJ) conducted a survey targeting 11,000 children in May and June in 2011 and found that about 90% of the children wanted to do something in rebuilding their communities. In response to these voices, SCJ started working with children in three communities in the affected region and they formed Children's Community Building Clubs.

### How the problem was addressed?

- What was done to address the problem?
   Empowering children by providing opportunities where children can speak out and participate in recovery process and supporting children to present their thoughts and ideas to decision makers and other members of their communities by themselves
- Who was involved and what role did they play?
  - Children: conducting various activities to creating better and resilient society
  - SCJ: supporting children's activities
  - Local governments: cooperating with children's activities
  - Parents and community people: participating in activities conducted by children
  - Private sector: providing funding and technical support
  - International organizations: providing children with opportunities to express their views on DRR
- What were the main challenges?
  - Children are busy with their study and extra curricula activities. The time they can spend on the activities of the Children's Community Building Club is limited and not many children are the members of the Clubs at present.
  - The slow progress of the entire community recovery process also sometimes affects negatively the momentum of the Clubs.
- How were they overcome?
   SCJ and members of Children's Community Building Clubs are trying to increase the number of the members by strengthening public relations activities and organize events and research in which non-member children can take part and speak out their thoughts and ideas.
- What are the lessons learnt?
   For meaningful child participation to be realized, providing children with time and places for participation is not sufficient. There must be continuous supports to motivate and encourage adult members of societies to listen to and embrace children's voices, incorporate their ideas and opinions into actual policies and activities, and create such systems that child participation is institutionalized.
- What could have been done differently and why? SCJ formed the Children's Community Building clubs on community basis (=outside any particular school and groups, organizations) so that children from different schools and backgrounds and ages but living in the same communities come together and interact each other. This approach made it possible to form really dynamic and active groups, but the number of the members tends to remain relatively small. On the other hand, other childfocused organizations such as UNICEF or World Vision formed children's groups on school or existed group basis (e.g. form a child group consisting of students from a same school). This made it possible to reach more number of children efficiently though the group dynamics tend to be more formal.

### Results

- What was the result of this approach/intervention?
   The SOFT project has proved that children are an active agent in building community, which has been recognized by parents, community people and local/national governments and international organizations.
- What were the key elements of success?
   Children make decisions and they themselves conduct activities, while adults facilitate, motivate and support them.

Measuring success	Was the success/impact measured? We conducted a progress review in 2012 and a mid-term evaluation in December, 2013. The results are positive.
	<ul> <li>If so, how / if not why not?         The progress review was conducted internally, and the mid-term evaluation was conducted by experts hired from outside as well as the Monitoring and Evaluation Section of SCJ. On the basis of the Logical Framework, activities and outcomes were assessed using indicators, such as numbers of events conducted and children and adults participated in activities and events.     </li> <li>Recommendations on the future activities were made.</li> </ul>
Relevance to HFA 1	Have the results contributed to HFA1 progress in the country? If so, how? Yes. In the reconstruction process from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, i.e. building community resilience, this project has contributed to strengthening capacities at the community level with a focus on children.
	<ul> <li>How can similar initiatives be better captured in DRR/HFA progress review?         Children are referred by DRR/HFA in the context of education at schools but not as active agents of change in their communities. It is important to incorporate a perspective that children are important members of communities and their voices need to be heard and reflected.     </li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Did HFA1 play a role in enabling this initiative? If yes, how / If no, what needs to be done in HFA2 to enable such initiatives? It is recommended that specific needs and rights of children and children's opinions and roles are included in HFA2 with regards to disaster preparedness, disaster management, emergency relief and rebuilding community.</li> </ul>
Potential for	Can this initiative be replicated?
replication	<ul> <li>Yes.</li> <li>Provide a brief explanation on: how, and if there is no potential for replication - Children's groups exist in many countries. It is possible for these groups to address developmental issues with a perspective of disaster risk reduction. This would lead to building resilient communities.</li> <li>Further, some virtual platform should be created to enable the children's groups interact each other across countries. As a result of exchange of experiences and opinions, children will be able to present their common opinions and recommendations to international policy makers in such occasions as UN World Conference on DRR in 2015.</li> </ul>
Contact	Provide contact information of the key person(s) for this example of practice Ms. Tomoko Tsuda     Deputy Director of Great East Japan Earthquake Recovery Program (also directly in charge of SOFT Project)     Save the Children Japan



# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR (JCC2015) Contribution towards 6AMCDRR for Key Area 3

15 December 2013

### **BACKGROUND**

The Great East Japan Earthquake devastated the Tohoku region of Japan on March 11th, 2011. Given the severity and extent of the resulting damage, many local governments were overwhelmed and were unable to assist affected communities effectively. Community groups were left without adequate assistance in the wake of the disaster and had to be self-reliant and resourceful in order to survive.

Engaging, empowering and involving community groups to be more pro-active in all phases of DRR can have a major impact in disaster-stricken and disaster-prone areas.

Both formal and informal community groups (E.g., Parent Teacher Associations, faith-based organisations) are crucial actors in these areas. Maximizing the potential of these groups helps to bolster the overall resilience of communities in disaster time.

Community groups and volunteer organizations from external areas also have a crucial role to play in the event of a large-scale disaster where local organisations' capacities are exceeded. Organized and trained community groups from external areas can be a major support in these cases, bringing critical resources and knowledge to help in times of disaster.

HFA1 has made a good start in the strengthening of the role of the community and volunteers in DRR¹ but there is still more to be done by governments and emergency planners/managers that will greatly benefit local level actors and overall levels of community disaster resilience. Empowering and building the capacity of community groups and volunteer organisations will help build more disaster resilient communities.

To achieve this we make three recommendations to be included in HFA2 (Details in the following pages):

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the capability and capacity of community and volunteer organisations through improving the management and coordination of volunteers

Recommendation 2: Strengthen the strategic role of the community and volunteer in all pha

Recommendation 2: Strengthen the strategic role of the community and volunteer in all phases of DRR

Recommendation 3: Building disaster resilient communities - Communities cannot be resilient in isolation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> **HFA1 Priority 1** - (iii) Community participation - <u>Key Activity (h)</u> Promote community participation in disaster risk reduction through the adoption of specific policies, the promotion of networking, the strategic management of volunteer resources, the attribution of roles and responsibilities, and the delegation and provision of the necessary authority and resources. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels

**HFA1 Priority 3** - Paragraph 18. Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities.

Key Activity (I) Promote community-based training initiatives, considering the role of volunteers, as appropriate, to enhance local capacities to mitigate and cope with disasters.

**HFA1 Priority 5** - Paragraph 20. At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management.

Key Activity (e) Promote the establishment of emergency funds, where and as appropriate, to support response, recovery and preparedness measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>Key Activity</u> (f) Develop specific mechanisms to engage the active participation and ownership of relevant stakeholders, including communities, in disaster risk reduction, in particular building on the spirit of volunteerism.

3. What enables local level action for DRR and resilience building?

#### **RECOMMENDATION 1**

1. STRENGTHEN THE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY OF COMMUNITY AND VOLUNTEER ORGANISATIONS THROUGH IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF VOLUNTEERS

### **Actions Required to Address this Issue:**

- 1.1. Develop and implement systematic training programmes in management, leadership skills and DRR for community members and volunteers
  - 1.1.1. Strengthen leadership skills required to effectively coordinate volunteers
  - 1.1.2. Build an organisational structure that enables the effective coordination of community members and volunteers
  - 1.1.3. Build skills on all levels to ensure the most effective relief possible (Addresses Underlying Question 3°C)
- 1.2. Recognise the importance of accountability towards volunteers
  - 1.2.1. Build a system that enables individuals to contribute to their full potential
    - 1.2.1.1. Ensure transparency of the organisation's objectives and of the goal and rationale for each activity
    - 1.2.1.2. Ensure transparency of the decision making process and enable volunteers to participate in that process
  - 1.2.2. Establish standards to ensure that volunteers and activities do not burden the people they seek to assist
    - 1.2.2.1. Volunteer organisations to establish and follow a code of conduct in line with international standards
  - 1.2.2.2. Volunteers to prepare resources to ensure that they are self-sufficient (Addresses Underlying Question 3.E)
- 1.3. Establish safety as a priority of the communities and organisations
  - 1.3.1. Develop a culture and system that assesses risk and puts in place safety standards to ensure the wellbeing of all involved in activities
  - 1.3.2. Pre-train community members and volunteers in the safety standards to ensure all participate without injury or illness
  - 1.3.3. (Addresses Underlying Question 3.C)
- 1.4. Develop a mechanism to ensure that all motivated individuals can be an active part of a response
  - 1.4.1. Build a culture within the community and volunteer organisations to be prepared and ready to accept assistance from volunteers
  - 1.4.2. Establish understanding that many response tasks can be fulfilled by those without disaster-specific skills by all sectors of the community including women, children and people living with disabilities

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.D)

### Voice from the ground:

Sakuma Ikuko, Tsunami survivor

### "THEY GAVE ME THE COURAGE AND DRIVE NOT TO GIVE UP"

Ms Sakuma Ikuko is the 7th generation of her family to own the Shinchinrou Restaurant in Ishinomaki, which has been open since 1855. However, Ms Sakuma's experiences in the tsunami made her reluctant to return to her business. She has vivid memories of the tsunami waves and the terrible screams of people swept away by them. Ms Sakuma rescued one person, who was miraculously able to climb into the third floor of the building, where Ms Sakuma used the curtains from the restaurant as a makeshift blanket for the survivor. Even now, Ms Sakuma has nightmares about the disaster. "A darkness was beginning to consume me and I didn't think I could make it through...' she said, 'but then, I saw the young volunteers, with their boundless energy, partaking in sludge and debris removal. They gave me courage and the drive not to give up. That is what the volunteers gave me.'

3. What enables local level action for DRR and resilience building?

### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

### 2. STRENGTHEN THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY AND VOLUNTEERS IN ALL PHASES OF DRR

### **Actions Required to Address this Issue:**

- 2.1. Recognise the strategic role of coordinated volunteers, including non-disaster related community groups
  - 2.1.1. Ensure all stakeholders recognise volunteer organisations as an equal stakeholder with defined roles in all phases of DRR
  - 2.1.2. Leverage community knowledge, resources and networks to deal with disasters
  - 2.1.3. Promote multi-stakeholder awareness and engagement to formulate effective plans and roles

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.A)

- 2.2. Define the responsibility and activities of community and volunteer organisations in all phases of DRR
  - 2.2.1. Community and volunteer organisations are to clearly define their responsibility, capability and capacity and ensure they maintain the stated level of commitment
  - 2.2.2. Gain commitment from all stakeholders to provide the necessary resources and funds to strengthen and maintain a strong volunteer sector

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.B)

- 2.3. Establish pre-determined roles for community members and volunteers
  - 2.3.1. Establish pre-determined roles to ensure the most effective deployment of resources
  - 2.3.2. Build and strengthen pre-arranged agreements to receive emergency supplies and equipment used in response activities

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.B)

### Case:

### "THE TRAINING OF COMMUNITIES AND VOLUNTEERS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S CAPACITY TO PREPARE FOR RELIEF AND RECOVERY EFFORTS"

The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami served as a chilling reminder that there is no country, no matter how technologically advanced, that is immune to major disasters. As well as being one of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world, Japan is also susceptible to a multitude of other disasters, from typhoons to tornadoes to severe flooding.

In the months following March 11th it became clear that one of the issues preventing a swift recovery from the disaster was a lack of individuals trained in disaster relief, and a lack of volunteer leaders with the capacity to organize efficient and safe deployment of volunteer groups. The training of volunteers and volunteer leaders would significantly strengthen the country's capacity to prepare for relief and recovery efforts for future natural disasters. Training individuals in disaster relief is a crucial investment for Japan, a country which will inevitably suffer natural disasters in the future.

The Earthquake Research Institute (ERI), University of Tokyo, predicts the probability of a major earthquake affecting the Tokyo Metropolitan area in the next 30 years as 86%. The Cabinet Office's Central Disaster Prevention Council carried out a study that estimates up to 323,000 fatalities may occur as a result of this major earthquake, with 70% of these fatalities predicted to be from the resulting tsunami (this study did not include any nuclear-related risks).

By carrying out community and volunteer training programmes, we are EDUCATING, ENGAGING and EMPOWERING individuals and communities to maximize their response to future disasters and to increase knowledge and awareness of Disaster Risk Reduction.

Area 3. - Local Level Action

**Key Question:** 

3. What enables local level action for DRR and resilience building?

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

- 3. BUILDING DISASTER RESILIENT COMMUNITIES
  - COMMUNITIES CANNOT BE RESILIENT IN ISOLATION

### **Actions Required to Address this Issue:**

- 3.1. Resilience of communities can be strengthened through ensuring that communities help communities
  - 3.1.1. During non-emergency phases, communities to foster an awareness of the need for cross-community, multi-stakeholder co-operation in both DRR and disaster response, and take steps to establish formal and informal links of cooperation with other communities
  - 3.1.2. Each community to work on their own DRR plan as well as preparedness to provide response for other communities in times of emergency
  - 3.1.3. Build a system to aid in the flow of resources between communities
  - 3.1.4. Build a culture and infrastructure that strengthens the ability to accept and work with volunteers coming from outside the community in times of emergency

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.E)

- 3.2. Encourage and enable the whole community, including those most vulnerable, to participate in all phases of DRR
  - 3.2.1. Strengthen leadership skills to actively increase inclusion and participation of the whole community
  - 3.2.2. Develop a method for individual community members to increasingly participate in volunteer activities
  - 3.2.3. Encourage existing community groups to participate in the DRR process and as volunteers in a response
  - 3.2.4. People, community groups and volunteers to take steps to anticipate disasters and reduce the vulnerabilities that they and the community face.

(Addresses Underlying Question 3.D)

#### Voice from the ground:

Yoshinobu Bandai (Ishinomaki, Japan Citizen, first phase volunteer)

### "WE ARE HERE FOR EACH OTHER, YOU ARE NOT ALONE"

I have been on the receiving end of emergency assistance from around the world and believe strongly that we can give back to other communities affected by disasters. I deployed to New York to tell those affected that: "We are here for each other, you are not alone". The local people expressed so much appreciation when I told them that I came from Ishinomaki in Japan. As a citizen of Ishinomaki, I am so grateful to have had this opportunity to go to the USA and help those affected by Hurricane Sandy.



# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR (JCC2015) Contribution towards 6AMCDRR for Key Area 5

December 25th 2013

### 1. LESS INFORMATION LEADING TO MORE UNDERLYING RISKS

If the governments consider health of the residents as top priority, then basic information on the types of risks associated with the vital facilities such as nuclear power plant should be disclosed before any disasters happen. On this point, Japan has failed quite considerably by putting up 'safety-myth' over its nuclear programs for decades. Taking away the opportunity for the surrounding residents to learn what the risks they are facing, or being accumulated, is in fact increasing the underlying risk factor for such communities.

As HFA Priority for Action 3 calls, knowledge and awareness plays key role in leading to preparedness actions. It is only such actions which decrease the potential risks, thus contributing to disaster risk reduction. If the residents around the nuclear power plant don't know what are the potentials risks, how to protect themselves in case of emergency, and who to ask for help in crisis situation, then presence of such vital facility is imposing risks that cannot be addressed; therefore, underlying risk level of these communities increase.

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), after its establishment in 2012, proposed 'a fundamental reexamination'. This indicated that the boundaries dividing the responsibilities of the national and local governments and the operators must be made clear and these include:

- A re-examination of the crisis management structure of the government. A structure must be established with a consolidated chain of command and the power to deal with emergency situations.
- National and local governments must bear responsibility for the response to off-site radiation release. They must act with public health and safety as the priority.
- The operator must assume responsibility for on-site accident response.

<u>RECOMMENDATION 1</u>: For countries possessing nuclear power plants, there needs to be independent, neutral, and impartial nuclear safety regulations and bodies such as NRA in Japan.

<u>RECOMMENDATION 2</u>: Government is primary duty bearer but monitoring system by the general public, who are right bearers, should be in place to ensure soundness of the mechanism.

<u>Therefore, monitoring by CSOs need to be embedded in risk assessment and analysis done by the states.</u>

Information management and disclosure plays key role in obtaining trust from the public, and it also leads to appropriate actions by those who are under potential exposure threat from radiation; such as immediate evacuation.

RECOMMENDATION 3: For safety of residents living in close proximity of high risk facility such as nuclear power plant, information should be clear on who is responsible and accountable (including who would pay compensation for residents' risks in case something goes wrong with the facility such as primary risk as in case of high prevalence rate of cancer, secondary risk of damage caused by harmful rumours or misinformation, losing of jobs, and separation of families as well as disintegration of communities). Therefore, accountability of each stakeholder needs to be clearly stated in the disaster management / risk reduction plans by the national and local governments.

Without such, increasing underlying risks associated with presence and operation of vital facilities will never be addressed. In Japan, decades of 'safety-myth' has prevented locals to think proactively on these things. The participants at the civil society led evaluation of disaster response to EJET also testified that "Pro-nuclear strategy of Japanese government (building of safety myths) has diluted the awareness on risks among the residents" and that "There was no emphasis on preparedness by the government, and past lessons do not seem to be utilized."

### 2. ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES

In lwaki-city for example, iodine was distributed but people weren't explained how exactly to use, leaving accumulation of radioiodine in thyroid of youth and children unattended. In Ookuma-machi, 4,000 iodine packs the local authority possessed were never distributed as there was no clear guidance from anyone when and how to distribute mainly due to chaotic situation at that time. Despite recommendation from some experts right after the accident on the need to immediately distribute iodine, the communication of this sort did not reach to appropriate action also due to chaos in communication system.

Recommendation 4: There is minimum accountability that needs to be fulfilled by all stakeholders involved. For example, company that owns the high risk facility as well as the government need to be open and transparent on risk communication, as well as mitigation and contingency plan. The local government that allowed establishment of the facility should disclose assessment procedure and criteria for safety assessment and reasons for approval. Residents also need to proactively understand minimum accountability level to anticipate from government and corporations and proactively seek for information identified as a gap if any. Therefore, in any public consultations for establishment of critical facilities, requirement for clear risk communication needs to be indicated by the legal framework.

#### 3. CONCLUSION

In sum, accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant teaches us that we are never free from unexpected situation and threat from nuclear accident. As long as humans rely on nuclear power plants to generate electricity, there are always risks of unprecedented disasters. From legal, technical, economic, social, and political perspectives, there are many lessons to be learnt from the disaster in Japan.

As in the case in Fukushima, it's not only scientists who respond at the time of crisis, and majority will be the people and disaster management authorities. Therefore, preparedness capacity needs to be built with those who are likely to take part of the response to possible nuclear disaster in the future.

There is a growing concern that many nuclear power plants are built in countries with active fault lines, high probability of natural disasters, and risks of terrorist attacks. Many countries that are ranked in top category in terms of risk from natural disasters possess or are seriously considering construction of nuclear power plants, and this includes countries with active conflict within their territories. In order to prevent similar accidents to happen in other parts of the world, JCC2015 strongly recommend that nuclear risks to be taken seriously as disaster risks, and for nations to join together to learn and mitigate any possible future catastrophes. And in order to do this, decreasing underlying risk level for residents around nuclear power plants, clarifying accountability lines and responsibilities of all stakeholders, and such measures should be strictly followed by external verifications, including monitoring by civil society.



# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR(JCC2015) Contribution towards 6AMCDRR for Key Area 6 12 December 2013

THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI of March 11, 2011 were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.

Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Chairman,

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

### 1. INTRODUCTION:

### **GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI (EJET)**


On March 11, 2011, a devastating 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck the north-eastern coast of Japan, triggering a massive tsunami that washed away several coastal cities, destroyed critical infrastructure, crippled thousands of businesses and caused the death of nearly twenty thousand people.

It also destabilized the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing reactors to overheat and leak radiation. Although it is fair to say that the scale of the disaster was far from 'expected', we now know that several measures could have been taken place before the disaster to mitigate the impact as much as possible. Various emergency systems existed in Japan, but those were "built on the assumption that nuclear disaster would not occur at the same time as an earthquake and tsunami... as a result, it was totally unprepared to respond to the accident." (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Report)

This paper, through experience of Japan going through unprecedented scale nuclear accident and its consequences, examines key accountability issues with high risk facility such as nuclear power plant.

### 2. CRITICAL INFORMATION FOR RESIDENTS

If the governments consider health of the residents as top priority, then basic information on the types of risks associated with the facility should be disclosed before any disasters happen. On this point, Japan has failed quite considerably by putting up 'safety-myth' over its nuclear programs for decades. Only after accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, nuclear regulatory governance was reviewed and reorganized to establish highly independent Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), an external organ of the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), on September 19, 2012. It is authorized to unite nuclear regulatory functions and, utilizing the latest state-of-the-art knowledge and experience, instigate independent, neutral and impartial nuclear safety regulations. (Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan Establishment and Operations—September 19, 2012-March 10, 2013) NRA led establishment of manual for Nuclear Disaster Countermeasure on October 19<sup>th</sup> 2012. This reform, which was results of numerous reviews and recommendations both official and independent, tells us importance of separation of utilization and regulation of nuclear power and independent body to oversee public safety.



NRA, after its establishment, proposed 'a fundamental re-examination'. This indicated that the boundaries dividing the responsibilities of the national and local governments and the operators must be made clear and these include:

- A re-examination of the crisis management structure of the government. A structure must be established with a consolidated chain of command and the power to deal with emergency situations.
- National and local governments must bear responsibility for the response to off-site radiation release. They must act with public health and safety as the priority.
- The operator must assume responsibility for on-site accident response.

Government is primarily duty bearer but monitoring system by the general public, who are right bearers, should be in place to ensure soundness of the mechanism.

Japanese government possesses System for Predication of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI). This system monitors and predicts the spread of radiation after nuclear emergency, using data gathered from Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) which is source of information to understand what is going on at nuclear power plant at the time of the serious accident. However, ERSS was damaged by explosion at the power plant, and no data was gathered into SPEEDI. In the end, SPEEDI's information was not released when people were desperately in need. "Critical information for life-or-death of affected communities was not transmitted by the government as they thought that we would panic and chaos will occur," said participants at the civil society led evaluation of disaster response to EJET.

Information management and disclosure plays key role in obtaining trust from the public, and it also leads to appropriate actions by those who are under potential exposure threat from radiation; such as immediate evacuation.

For safety of residents living in close proximity of high risk facility such as nuclear power plant, information should be clear on who is responsible and accountable (including who would pay compensation for residents' risks in case something goes wrong with the facility such as primary risk as in case of high prevalence rate of cancer, secondary risk of damage caused by harmful rumours or misinformation, losing of jobs, and separation of families as well as disintegration of communities). In Japan, decades of 'safety-myth' has prevented locals to think proactively on these things. The

participants at the civil society led evaluation of disaster response to EJET also testified that "Pro-nuclear strategy of Japanese government (building of safety myths) has diluted the awareness on risks among the residents" and that "There was no emphasis on preparedness by the government, and past lessons do not seem to be utilized."

### 3. ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES

Compared with atomic bomb which was dropped in Hiroshima in 1945, the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant has blasted out 2.5 times more of Iodine 131 (half-life in 8 days) and 169 times more of Cessium 137 (half-life in 30.1 years). This Iodine 131, which is radioactive iodine, accumulates in thyroid, and it poses risk of thyroid cancer. Iodine (non-radioactive) also accumulated in thyroid, so intake of iodine will prevent (block) radioiodine to be accumulated in thyroid, thus decrease the probability of thyroid cancer in future. For this, iodine needs to be taken into the body right before the exposure to radiation.

However, in Iwaki-city for example, iodine was distributed but people weren't explained how exactly to use, leaving accumulation of radioiodine in thyroid of youth and children unattended. In Ookuma- machi, 4,000 iodine packs the local authority possessed were never distributed as there was no clear guidance from anyone when and how to distribute mainly due to chaotic situation at that time.

Despite recommendation from some experts right after the accident on the need to immediately distribute iodine, the communication of this sort did not reach to appropriate action also due to chaos in communication system.

There is minimum accountability that needs to be fulfilled by all stakeholders involved. For example, company that owns the high risk facility as well as the government need to be open and transparent on risk communication, as well as mitigation and contingency plan. The local government that allowed establishment of the facility should disclose assessment procedure and criteria for safety assessment and reasons for approval. Residents also need to proactively understand minimum accountability level to anticipate from government and corporations and proactively seek for information indentified as a gap if any.

Accountability measures by various stakeholders should be clarified and followed. Civil society shall be empowered to monitor whether such accountability measures are put in practice or not. Furthermore, there should be formal process of civil society lodging any complaint mechanism against the accountability requirements on high risk facilities. It is important to note that people who are first responders of nuclear crisis are not nuclear scientists, but they are local residents, local government personnel, and disaster management committees, etc. who are not necessarily the experts on this matter. In complex disasters (e.g. nuclear disaster caused by tsunami), also considering the increasing number of natural disasters globally due to climate change, it is difficult to draw a line between what extent of damage is caused by human errors and purely by nature.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

In sum, accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant teaches us that we are never free from unexpected situation and threat from nuclear accident. As long as humans rely on nuclear power plants to generate electricity, there are always risks of unprecedented disasters. From legal, technical, economic, social, and political perspectives, there are many lessons to be learnt from the disaster in Japan.

As in the case in Fukushima, it's not only scientists who respond at the time of crisis, and majority will be the people and disaster management authorities. Therefore, preparedness capacity needs to be built with those who are likely to take part of the response to possible nuclear disaster in the future.

There is a growing concern that many nuclear power plants are built in countries with active fault lines, high probability of natural disasters, and risks of terrorist attacks. Many countries that are ranked in top category in terms of risk from natural disasters possess or are seriously considering construction of nuclear power plants, and this includes countries with active conflict within their territories. In order to prevent similar accidents to happen in other parts of the world, JCC2015 strongly recommend that nuclear risks to be taken seriously as disaster risks, and for nations to join together to learn and mitigate any possible future catastrophes. And in order to do this, accountability lines and responsibilities of all stakeholders should be made clear, and be strictly followed by external verifications, including monitoring by civil society.

#### Reference

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- Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan Establishment and Operations--September 19, 2012-March 10, 2013 http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/data/20130514torikumi.pdf
- Joint Review: CSO Response to East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (JANIC 2013)
- Lessons and Recommendations from Japanese Civil Society for the Post 2015 DRR Framework http://www.janic.org/en/pdf/statement\_post2015drr\_en.pdf



# Japan CSO Coalition for 2015WCDRR (JCC2015) Contribution towards 6AMCDRR for Key Area 7

15 January 2014

### Collaboration between Business sector and NGOs in Japan

The case from Japan Platform,
NGOs & Companies Partnership Promotion Network, and
The Network of Civil Disaster Response Organizations and Supporters of Disaster-Stricken Areas

Japan CSO Coalition for 2015 WCDRR
CWS Japan, CWS-Asia/Pacific
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
Peace Boat Disaster Volunteer Center

### 1. HISTORY OF 3 NETWORKS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PAPER

NGOs & Companies Partnership Promotion Network (http://www.janic.org/ngo\_network)

This network was founded in March, 2008, and it holds regular dialogue for member between NGOs and Companies in order to identify issues possible to be addressed in cooperation between NGOs and Companies. There are about 40 NGOs as well as more than 20 major Japanese corporations involved in this network, and Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), the biggest NGO network in Japan, play a key role as a secretariat. The aim of the network is to contribute to eradication of poverty as well as achieving MDGs at the global scale utilizing sector-wide collaboration. It aims to improve quality and quantity of cooperation between NGOs and business sector. The partnership types between business sector and NGOs have three categories<sup>1</sup>:

- Philanthropic (charitable) type: One-way relationship, Involvement of companies in NGOs' activities is relatively low. NGOs tend to show gratitude to the companies as if they were donors.
- Transactional Type: Relationship which produces mutual understanding and trust. There are some similarities on mission/values and strong connections at individual leader level.
- Integrative Type: Relationship which is integrated to the business. With the common mission/ value, they are mutually involved. Organizational culture tends to be mutually affected. This is the most advanced relationship type and this is where the network aims to achieve.

JANIC also serves as secretariat for Japan CSO Coalition for 2015 WCDRR (JCC2015). JCC2015 was established on January 10<sup>th</sup> 2014 with over 50 CSOs and CSO networks in Japan to ensure collective advocacy, information sharing, and joint actions towards WCDRR in March 2015.

### The Network of Civil Disaster Response Organizations and Supporters of Disaster-Stricken Areas

This network was established in November 2011 and aims to strengthen cross-sector partnerships to enhance the support for communities affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, as well as to enhance preparedness for future disasters. The network is comprised of over 100 corporations and CSOs, each with their unique areas of expertise, including IBM Japan, the Nippon Foundation and Just Giving Japan. Corporations and CSOs bring diverse resources, skills and experiences which can be shared through this network in order to maximize the potential of both current and future activities within

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Collaboration Challenge, Jossey-Bass Publisher, 2000

all phases of the disaster cycle. Peace Boat Disaster Volunteer Center (PBV) serves as a secretariat. The main objectives of the network are as follows:

- Encourage cross-sector cooperation and continue effective support for areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake
- Share resources, experiences and lessons learnt from network participants to improve preparedness for future disasters.

Japan Platform (http://www.japanplatform.org/E/work/index.html)<sup>2</sup>

Founded in August 2000, Japan Platform (JPF) provides a platform to conduct international aid with a tripartite cooperation system where NGOs, business community (Keidanren – the biggest business association in Japan), and government of Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) work in close cooperation, based on equal partnership, making the most of the respective sectors' characteristics and resources. JPF's origin was in Kosovo, when a massacre of ethnic Albanians aggravated, triggered by NATO's aerial bombing started in April 1999, resulted to exodus of approximately 500 thousand refugees to neighbouring nations. Right after the incident, several Japanese NGOs started to examine the possibility of refugee assistance in Kosovo.

The operation of refugee camp requires comprehensive and prompt aid activities ranging various sectors from food distribution, medical treatment, waste disposal, sanitation, and social welfare. The examination revealed, however, that Japanese NGOs were not able to implement effective aid activities independently; since the respective NGOs had neither sufficient financial foundation nor staff-members with considerable on-the-job experience to implement aid independently. Consequently, four NGOs planed to implement assistance activities by jointly establishing a camp in Albania, named "Camp Japan" for Kosovo refugees. The plan itself was not realized due to the return of refugees to Kosovo followed by ceasing of aerial bombing. Taking into account the lessons learned from the Camp Japan plan, a new framework, a "Japan Platform" conception was formulated.

The objects of the framework is that NGOs, business community, and a government agency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) work together for the prompter and more effective implementation of emergency aid with a tripartite cooperation system, based on equal partnership, making the most of the respective sectors' peculiarities and resources. In preparation for a flood of refugees or a devastating disaster, Japan Platform has improved standby functions, such as making emergency aid plans and storing emergency aid supplies, taking advantages of know-how and resources of the respective actors. CWS Japan is a member of JPF as well.

### 2. RELEVANCE TO KEY QUESTIONS

- What is the issue that your country (organization/stakeholder group) recommend to prioritize in HFA2?
  - In order to enhance collaboration between business sector and NGOs, more emphasis on coordination and engagement should play at regional/local level and not only in capital cities (e.g. Tokyo). To achieve this, contribution from both NGOs and business sector (and preferably with back-up from government) to keep such nation-wide network going on from both financial sense and human resource sense. Through above coordination, integrative type of partnership between business sector and NGOs become possible. These networks also need to ensure that core competencies of the members (both corporations and NGOs) are identified and shared on constant basis in prior for any joint action.
  - Coordination mechanism between business sector and NGOs ensure that the collaboration is based on:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> JPF is a collaborator in this paper, which means that although they offered case story and inputs towards this paper, JPF is not officially among agencies who are putting these requests.

- Shared aims/mission/purpose with understanding of difference and uniqueness of both sectors
- Notion of 'responsible business' and value not only economic perspectives but social and environmental perspectives
- Understanding local needs with longer-term solution-oriented perspective
- Have appropriate focus on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as their role in community level activities and environment can be much bigger than mega-coordination at capital city level.
- Emphasize on the networking that creates personal relationship between CSR representatives from corporations and NGO representatives. This would allow in-depth understanding of resources each stakeholder has, and such understanding plays a key role when it comes to exploring collaboration opportunities.
- Why have you selected this as a priority?

What is the progress and challenges in addressing this issue?

- Progress is definitely establishment of networks such as JPF and NGOs & Companies Partnership Promotion Network.
- Challenge is how to ensure that the Integrative Type of relationship is formulated within such networks. Without proactive establishment of enabling environment, relationship usually end with philanthropic type and/or transaction type. It is important to note that CSR representatives often seek for information and materials they can utilize to convince the management on the company's CSR strategy. For this, ability to propose win-win solutions from NGOs are required. This point is evident from frequent request from companies such as 'please be explicit what are needed on the ground and what you need from us'.

### Did HFA1 play a role? If not, why?

 HFA1 played a very limited role, because in Japan, HFA in general is considered a framework for only developing countries. Awareness on such international framework needs to be enhanced at various levels in Japan.

### What are the actions required to address this issue? (maximum 5 actions)

- Promote business/NGO collaborative network in different parts of the country, and to provide necessary support to enable this.
- Disseminate best practices of Integrative Type of relationship between business sector and NGO sector. Such dissemination should take place at local/national levels, as well as regional and global levels.
- Focus on the role of SMEs as they are usually the ones who are closest to the local communities. 99.7% of corporations in Japan are considered SMEs as per Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's statistics from 2012. There are region-based networks available (such as Corporate Volunteers Social Welfare Council encourage to establish), and such networks are great places to start region/local based networking to seek collaborations. From Japanese networks' experience, incentives of companies to engage in CSR activities is not only business interest, but rather prior relationship and friendship affect greatly to where companies want to get involved. To utilize such characteristics, it is important to identify which companies would be sympathetic to which geographical area or segment of population, and to propose collaboration possibilities with those companies (so not one-size fits all).

- Have clear guideline and emphasis from Government (e.g. Cabinet Office) or business association (e.g. Keidanren) on how companies can play a role in communities' DRR efforts. Such central and top-down messages are often heard by the companies as it is in their interest to be attentive to what the leaders say. On Global Compact, there are increasing participation from Japanese companies. NGOs can be attentive to such characteristics of the companies, and to seek shared vision and purpose based on this foundation.
- List the stakeholders who should be engaged in implementing the recommendations made above. What could be the mechanisms to engage and build partnership between the stakeholders?
  - Existing coordination networks proactively identify and share core competency of each members and aim for **integrative type** of partnership.
  - UNISDR share the best practices globally on integrative type of partnership.
  - NGOs / NGO networks involve business sector in their coordination activities and enhance understanding of core competencies of the business sector and their involvement in social benefits.
  - Governments provide appropriate tax incentives for social work by the companies, and to provide some grant schemes to ensure appropriate coordination between business sector and NGOs take place. But more importantly, governments are encouraged to send key messages to domestic industries how it want to see advanced level of collaboration between companies and civil society in order to achieve common interest (e.g. decreased risk from hazards).
  - Business associations involve NGOs in coordination activities and enhance understanding of core competencies of the NGO sector and their involvement in social benefits.
  - Based on the foundation of establishing national DRR platforms, more emphasis should be given on inclusion of private sector into such coordination network. If NGO-private sector coordination network is already available in country, one should consider utilizing it. If it doesn't exist, creation of such networks can be considered, and best practice from around the globe should be shared while establishing / strengthening such networks.
- How should this issue be addressed in HFA2? What could be the accountability framework to address this issue in HFA2? Who needs to be accountable to take the recommended actions? Who are the actors will be accountable to? What targets and indicators could be used to measure progress and underpin accountability measures? How can these targets and indicators be monitored and measured?
  - Accountability framework:
    - Clarify responsibility of each stakeholder to enable this coordination to aim for integrative type of relationship for social benefits.
  - Who needs to be accountable: All stakeholders need to be accountable, but primarily NGO networks and business association. The government needs to ensure that appropriate enabling environment is provided, and progress is reported under its HFA2 periodic monitoring report.
  - Accountable to: This should be clarified and shared on case by case basis. For example, when
    working for DRR in other developing nations, community members of these countries ultimately
    need to be primary beneficiaries.
  - Targets and indicators:
    - Existence of network that brings together business sector and NGOs (this is a pre-requisite for any collaboration between business sector and NGOs). Connections between different networks are also important factor.

- Number and details of collaborative cases in each type (philanthropic, transactional, integrative).
- Clear messages provided by either the government or business association to encourage such collaboration between companies and civil society for common purpose.
- Monitoring and measurement:
  - Progress needs to be reported by these networks to contribute to national HFA2 monitoring report.

### 3. CASE STORIES

 Substantiate the recommendations with an example of good practices (2-3 pages maximum) using the suggested template attached

### Case Story 1: from JPF

Title of the Good practice/case study	Creating synergy by linking contribution from companies to NGO's relief and recovery for effective collaboration
Abstract	JPF has created list of contributable items from companies to assist NGO/NPO's activities in East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (EJET) affected area. By doing so, JPF was able to link the contribution from companies for relief and recovery activities effectively.
Context	The network to link companies and NGO/NPO was still weak, and it led to difficult in access of relief items from companies and delay in such logistics. Furthermore, if contribution comes from core business of each companies in solo, it is difficult to be need-based as it is supply-driven. In other words, someone needs to coordinate such assistance based on the needs of the affected areas.
How the problem was addressed?	<ul> <li>After EJET, many companies tried to provide material aid to the affected sites, but it was difficult for them to coordinate with NGO/NPO working in the area. JPF has designated one officer to handle this coordination, and made a list of contributable items from companies which was then shared with NGO/NPO working in the affected area. This has enabled one stop provision of information on what can be provided, and it worked as point of contact for both companies and NGO/NPO.</li> <li>Each company sought to provide their core business product in order to assist the affected areas, but it was difficult to lead to an effective relief and recovery with such supply-driven contribution from one company alone.</li> </ul>
	• Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. has decided to provide vehicles for EJET relief. These vehicles had some issues (such as with the number plates) and they were only allowed to be used in Japan for a short while. Therefore, Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. wanted these vehicles to be used for EJET relief initially, but later on to be sent to Africa for humanitarian activities there. JPF has discussed this matter with member NGOs, and designated some NGOs to receive these vehicles. As March is still in winter and Northeast region in Japan snows a lot, studless winter tires were necessary. On this issue, JPF met with Bridgestone Corporation to have these tires provided for free of cost. Furthermore, after relief phase of EJET, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK LINE) offered to ship these vehicles for free to Africa. The vehicles are currently utilized by Japanese NGO's humanitarian activities in Africa. JPF has ensured each contribution by companies are utilized effectively by providing such coordination role.
Results	<ul> <li>By linking each contribution from companies, JPF was able to create a synergy (big value) which allowed the contributions to be utilized effectively.</li> <li>Element for such success is constant relationship building JPF has undertaken before EJET. This allowed JPF to understand what each companies are able to provide, which led to brainstorming on possible combination of each contribution.</li> </ul>
Measuring success	The success has been measured by how much impact such combination of each contribution by companies produced.

Relevance to HFA 1 (optional)	This case contributes to HFA1's Priority for Action 5 as it enhances companies' contribution to humanitarian actions.
	However, it is not sure whether HFA1 contributed to this case. It is necessary to disclose such effective collaboration cases proactively.
Potential for replication	<ul> <li>It is possible to replicate by ensuring a list (menu) of contributable items from companies is made and shared, and link them to relief and recovery activities proactively.</li> </ul>
Contact	Collaborator: Mr. Naoya Hirano Liaison Officer, Japan Platform naoya.hirano@japanplatform.org

### **Case story 2: NGOs & Companies Partnership Promotion Network**

Title of the Good practice/case study	Provision of IT Cloud service for Relief Phase of EJET
Abstract	Data related to needs assessment during initial relief phase of mega-disaster can be overwhelming in terms of amount of information that needs to be gathered, assessed, analyzed, and shared. Cloud service from Fujitsu Limited enabled provision of IT platform that allowed utilization of vast amount of information on needs of the affected communities.
Context	After EJET in 2011, vast amount of information gathered on needs of affected communities were hard to be assessed, analyzed, and shared systematically. Many local government offices were also affected by tsunami and nuclear accident, and information handling was not done effectively. There were need for
How the problem was addressed?	Fujitsu Limited has dispatched IT engineer to affected areas who established cloud system within 5 days. This system is also used for managing prevalence information of bird flu and foot-and-mouth disease. This SaaS type Cloud system enabled management of vast needs related information within one platform, which can produce statistical outputs with search engine function.
Results	<ul> <li>The intervention expedited information management during relief phase.</li> <li>Key elements of success has been Fujitsu Limited's commitment to protect social infrastructure that they established in the affected area. There were over 1,500 staff from the company that were dispatched to the affected sites.</li> </ul>
Measuring success	The outputs from this Cloud system was widely shared and utilized by aid community during EJET relief phase.
Relevance to HFA 1 (optional)	<ul> <li>This case contributes to HFA1's Priority for Action 5 as it enhances companies' contribution to humanitarian actions.</li> <li>However, it is not sure whether HFA1 contributed to this case. It is necessary to disclose such effective collaboration cases proactively.</li> </ul>
Potential for replication	By learning more in depth how Fujitsu Limited contributed using their core IT strength for EJET relief, it is possible to replicate such practice globally.
Contact	Mr. Takeshi Tomino Deputy Secretary General, JANIC Secretariat of Japan CSO Coalition for 2015 WCDRR ttomino@janic.org

# <u>Case story 3</u>: Network of Civil Disaster Response Organizations and Supporters of Disaster-stricken Areas

Title of the Good practice/case study	Cross-sector cooperation between CSOs and Corporations encourage involvement and maximize effectiveness of activities in Disaster Risk Reduction
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Abstract	In the wake of EJET, a significant number of corporations worked in partnership with CSOs to provide relief to affected communities. The Network of Civil Disaster Response Organizations and Supporters of Disaster-stricken Areas was established in 2011in order to maximize the potential for these kinds of cross-sector partnerships to assist areas affected by EJET, as well as to improve preparedness for future disasters.
Context	The EJET was a major disaster that overwhelmed governmental, corporate and civil organizations. In hindsight, had strong partnerships between the private and civil sectors existed prior to the disaster and if cross-sector agreements had been in place, relief activities could have been more effective and efficient. Looking towards the long-term recovery of the Tohoku region as well as the occurrence of future disasters, it is vital that experiences, lessons learnt and resources are shared between both the civil and private sectors and these partnerships are strengthened to improve future responses.
How the problem was addressed?	The Network of Civil Disaster Response Organizations and Supporters of Disaster-stricken Areas encourages these kinds of partnerships in the Tohoku region. Starting in May 2013, a number of network participants visited Onagawa Town in Miyagi Prefecture in order to build relations with the local communities and determine ways in which they can support long-term recovery. Having found opportunities to support and manage projects focusing on health, education and tourism, the member corporations and CSOs are currently implementing these programs in close cooperation with local communities.
Results	Corporations and CSOs are able to share resources and expertise in order to contribute to the long-term recovery of areas affected by the EJET.
Measuring success	These projects serve as a strong example of cross-sector partnerships that allow for more effective use of resources.
Relevance to HFA 1 (optional)	This case story is relevant to HFA1's Priority for Action 5 as it focuses on the private sector's contribution to humanitarian crises and disasters.
Potential for replication	By replicating the formal process whereby corporations and CSOs can share experiences and lessons learnt regarding past disasters, future disaster-related activities can be improved.
Contact	Mr. Takashi Yamamoto President, Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center junior@peaceboat.gr.jp

### 4. CONTACT

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Contributor: Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center, Takashi Yamamoto, President junior@peaceboat.gr.jp

Collaborator: JPF, Naoya Hirano, Liaison Officer

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